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 Neglected Victory
The Canadian Corps at Hill 70
Matthew Walthert
Abstract: For 90 years, the Battle of Hill 
70, 15-25 August, 1917, was largely 
ignored or forgotten by Canadian 
historians. This, despite the fact that 
General Arthur Currie, who commanded 
the Canadian Corps for the first time 
in the battle, declared it “a great 
and wonderful victory” and “the 
hardest battle in which the Corps has 
participated.” Why is this so? Against 
tough odds, the Corps captured the high 
ground and caused heavy casualties 
amonst the Germans as they counter-
attacked. However, in the days following 
this success, the Canadians pushed 
their luck too far. Trying to take the 
town of Lens, which Hill 70 overlooked, 
thousands of men were needlessly 
sacrificed.
© Canadian Military History, Volume 19, Number 1, Winter 2010, pp.21-36.
“Many historians regard [the Battle of Hill 70] as the 
outstanding achievement of the 
[Canadian] Corps,”1 writes Terry 
Copp. He is correct that the battle, 
fought in and around the town 
of Lens from 15-25 August 1917, 
was an outstanding victory for the 
Canadians, but it has not received 
the same attention as other Canadian 
battles of the Great War. Why is this? 
While 2nd Ypres, Passchendaele, the 
Last Hundred Days, and Vimy Ridge 
have all merited book-length studies, 
Hill 70 has been largely neglected. 
The only substantial published texts 
on the Battle of Hill 70 come from 
G.W.L. Nicholson’s official history, 
Canadian Expeditionary Force, and 
Tim Cook’s Shock Troops.2 While 
Nicholson provides a very good 
basic description of events, it is 
necessarily a top-down history and 
lacks description of the experiences 
of individual soldiers in battle. In 
fact, Nicholson rarely describes any 
actions lower than at the brigade 
or battalion level and the only non-
generals mentioned by name are 
those that were awarded a Victoria 
Cross. Cook’s work gives a great 
description of the battle from the 
soldiers’ perspectives, but there is 
still more detailed analysis that can 
be done, as Hill 70 represents only a 
small fraction of Cook’s two-volume 
opus. 
 Geoff Jackson published an 
article on the battle in the Winter 
2008 issue of Canadian Military 
History. He focused on the mostly 
unsuccessful secondary attacks into 
Lens in the days following the seizure 
of the hill itself. Indeed, Jackson 
arbitrarily separated Hill 70 into two 
distinct battles: the attack on the hill 
and the push into Lens.3 While he 
acknowledged that the capture of 
the hill was an outstanding feat, he 
implied, by devoting the majority 
of his article to it, that the failure 
to capture Lens overshadowed the 
entire operation. These attacks into 
the town were poorly planned, 
undermanned, and under-supported, 
but the number of men involved 
makes the attacks closer to a series 
of large-scale raids than a separate 
battle. These attacks into Lens will 
be examined in depth later. 
 This paper explores the battle 
in greater detail than Nicholson, 
combining the descriptions of 
individual soldiers with the actions 
taken by smaller units that led to 
Corps-wide success on the battlefield. 
It will analyze why the Hill 70 battle 
has remained relatively obscure and 
consider what this says about our 
collective memory of the Great War. 
In most works that deal with Hill 
70, the role of the artillery has been 
emphasized as the most important 
aspect of the battle. While the artillery 
had a significant and crucial part to 
play, this essay will also attempt to 
give the “ground pounders” their 
due, as the hill could not have been 
won, nor held, without them. Nearly 
all the war diaries describe brutal 
hand-to-hand combat for extended 
periods of time, as the Canadians 
fought their way up the hill, and 
then struggled to hold it through 
numerous German counter-attacks. 
Six Victoria Crosses were awarded to 
the infantry, and like any other battle, 
countless brave and heroic acts went 
unrewarded. 
 Hill 70 was Arthur Currie’s 
first battle as commander of the 
Canadian Corps, and he wrote that 
it was “the hardest battle in which 
the Corps has participated,” but also 
“a great and wonderful victory.” As 
well, according to Currie, General 
Headquarters “regard it as one 
of the finest performances of the 
War.”4 And yet, for 90 years this 
battle was largely ignored in the 
historiography. Certainly, when 
we talk about the war today, Hill 
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70 is never mentioned in the same 
breath as Vimy, Passchendaele, 
or the Somme. Perhaps this is 
because Hill 70 does not have a 
ready-made, engaging storyline. The 
horrors of the Passchendaele mud, 
valiantly overcome by the tenacious 
Canadians, may be a more engaging 
tale. Vimy has been elevated to a 
nation-forming battle; it was the first 
time the Corps fought together as a 
whole. Hill 70, on the other hand, was 
conceived as a diversionary attack to 
keep a number of German divisions 
occupied while the Third Battle of 
Ypres got under way further north. 
There was no romantic splendor to 
the battle. The objective was not to 
capture a strategic position (although 
the British did want Lens for its coal 
production), but rather the creation 
of a meat grinder of shrapnel and 
bullets designed to kill as many 
Germans as possible, in keeping 
with Sir Douglas Haig’s policy for 
a war of attrition. Still, Nicholson 
devotes nearly as many pages to 
Hill 70 as he does to Vimy in his 
official history. In addition, Hill 70 
was a more thoroughly Canadian 
battle than Vimy, where much of the 
artillery and logistical support for 
the Canadian infantry came from the 
British. Hill 70 was largely planned, 
and for the most part carried out, by 
Canadians. Vimy was seen as a great 
victory because neither the French, 
nor the British, had been able to take 
it for three years. Hill 70 and Lens 
had been held and fortified by the 
Germans since 1914, although the 
British did temporarily seize the hill 
during the Battle of Loos in 1915. This 
is not meant to suggest that Hill 70 
was as significant a battle as Vimy, 
but merely that it was an important 
part of the Canadian war effort. It 
also demonstrated that the victory 
at Vimy was not a fluke, but a sign 
of things to come from the Canadian 
Corps.
 What, then, can we say about 
Canadians’ collective memory 
of the First World War, and Hill 
70 in particular? Surely, we are 
uncomfortable with certain aspects 
of the war, or at least our perceptions 
of those aspects. For example, we 
are horrified by the slaughter that 
took place in Europe from 1914-1918. 
And we are even more horrified 
by the perception that it was all in 
vain. Indeed, 20 years later, we were 
embroiled in an even deadlier war. 
However, in the Second World War, 
we knew what we were fighting 
for (to stop the spread of Facism). 
Although Canadians who fought 
in the Great War certainly had their 
own reasons for fighting, do those 
of us who look back, from nearly 
100 years in the future, understand 
them? Maybe not. Instead, many 
Canadians think of lines of men, 
mowed down by machine guns. 
Perhaps, unfortunately, Hill 70, like 
the first day of the Somme, plays up 
that stereotype, since the goal of the 
Canadians was to literally butcher as 
many Germans as possible. Therefore, 
no matter how successful they were 
in achieving that goal, there was 
no way the battle would ever be 
remembered the same as some of 
our other victories. This limitation, 
though, should not dissuade us from 
further study of the battle. 
Left: Canadian soldiers practice bringing 
a Vickers medium machine gun quickly 
into action prior to the Hill 70 battle.
Below left: Troops of the 2nd Canadian 
Infantry Brigade receive hot tea at a 
Soup and Tea Kitchen within a quarter 
mile of the front line on the night before 
the attack on Hill 70.
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 After Vimy, Lieutenant-General 
Sir Julian Byng had been promoted 
from Canadian Corps commander 
to General Officer Commanding 
Third Army. On 6 June 1917, Currie 
was notified that he would be taking 
over command of the corps, the 
first Canadian to do so, and on 12 
June, the king knighted him.5 On 
7 July, orders came from General 
Haig through the First Army, 
under command of General Henry 
Horne, telling the Canadian Corps 
to take the French mining town of 
Lens, approximately ten kilometers 
northeast of Vimy Ridge. The goal 
was to prevent the Germans from 
sending reinforcements north to 
Passchendaele, where the British 
Army was already floundering in the 
mud. Currie went forward to survey 
the terrain that the Canadians were 
to attack. After laying in the grass 
all morning, he determined that one 
of the two hills overlooking the city, 
Sallaumines to the south and Hill 70 
to the north, would need to be taken 
before Lens itself could be attacked, 
otherwise the Germans would control 
the high ground surrounding nearly 
half the city.6 He also consulted 
his staff officers over the proposed 
plan, at which point Colonel A.G.L. 
McNaughton vehemently opposed 
a frontal assault on the town, calling 
it a “bloody fool operation.”7 Currie 
brought his concerns to General 
Horne, asking that the Canadians 
be allowed to take Hill 70 before 
Lens. Horne’s orders, though, were 
to take Lens directly, so he referred 
the matter to Haig. Currie met with 
the commander-in-chief and easily 
convinced him of his plan. Haig 
expressed his confidence in Currie’s 
abilities and assured the Canadian 
that he trusted him to accomplish 
what had been asked of the corps.8 
With that, it was decided that the 
Canadians would attack Hill 70 in 
late July or early August.
 In the lead-up to the battle, the 
Canadians participated in a number 
of training exercises that had become 
standard since Vimy. The most 
important of these exercises was the 
full-scale rehearsal on a taped course 
representing the actual battlefield.9 
Deward Barnes, of the 19th Battalion, 
recorded his training experiences in 
his diary on 22 July, writing that for 
the next few days we practiced over 
tapes, getting ready for Hill 70…the 
tapes were laid out as streets and 
buildings according to area maps and 
named before you got there. Each 
man was supposed to know what 
street or lane to go down when the 
real thing came (all bosh).10
Even though Barnes dismissed the 
training as “bosh,” it proved to be an 
important part of the corps’ success, 
as each man knew exactly what his 
role was during the attack. 
 By early August, preparations 
for the battle were being completed 
as Currie waited for a break in the 
weather. The plan called for the 
1st and 2nd Divisions, with five 
battalions each, to assault the slopes 
of Hill 70, as well as the northern 
suburbs of Lens, during the initial 
attack. Meanwhile, one battalion 
from the 4th Division would mount 
a diversionary attack into Lens itself, 
hoping to confuse the Germans 
into thinking the actual attack was 
taking place there. To the north of the 
Canadians, the 46th British Division 
set up another diversion, which 
included artillery bombardments and 
the deployment of dummy tanks. No 
tanks were actually used – this was 
to be an artillery, machine gun, and 
infantry battle.
 Once the attacking Canadian 
infantry reached their objectives, 
old German trenches on the slope 
of the hill, they were to construct 
strongpoints around the 48 Vickers 
guns that each brigade would bring 
forward during the attack. As much 
as possible, Canadian artillery would 
then be used to break up the expected 
counterattacks. Currie knew the 
Germans could not afford to lose 
Hill 70, as it would compromise 
their position in Lens. By taking 
the high ground, Currie hoped to 
draw German reinforcements into 
the open where Canadian gunners 
could annihilate them with massed 
shellfire.11 
 At Vimy, the artillery used new 
continuous wave wireless radios for 
the first time. These radios emitted 
a continuous radio wave and, by 
switching the wave on and off for 
varying periods of time, a person 
with a transmitter and a receiver 
could send and receive Morse Code 
messages. As the war progressed, the 
various armies on the Western Front 
discovered a number of applications 
for this technology, including 
communication from observers in 
airplanes or forward observers on the 
ground to gunners in the rear. Since 
the radios had worked well at Vimy, 
in late July two Canadian Heavy 
Brigade wireless sets were erected 
at Bully-Grenay and on Vimy Ridge. 
Then, the first-ever registration of 
guns by wireless was carried out in 
preparation for the upcoming Hill 
70 offensive. It took three days, but 
the results were excellent, so four 
wireless stations were erected for 
the battle. This would allow forward 
observers more direct contact with 
the artillery behind the lines.12 
 The artil lery committed in 
this battle was substantial. Each of 
the two assaulting divisions was 
supported by 102 18-pounder guns, 
as well as 24 4.5-inch howitzers.13 All 
four Canadian divisional artilleries 
would participate, as well as the 
46th Divisional Artillery, two army 
field brigades, and a variety of other 
batteries.14 Currie fought hard to have 
the best possible artillery support for 
his troops, knowing full well that for 
the cost of a few extra shells, the lives 
of hundreds of infantrymen could be 
saved.15
 As preparations for the attack 
continued, Colonel McNaughton, 
the corps’ counter-battery staff 
officer, began targeting German 
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guns to neutralize them before 
the infantrymen had to expose 
themselves outside the trenches. 
McNaughton had charge of three 
counter-battery groups, totalling 
58 guns,16 with which to harass the 
estimated 102 German batteries that 
faced the Canadians. By 15 August, 
the Canadian guns had knocked 40 
hostile batteries out of the fight.17 This 
was an important factor in getting the 
infantry safely across no-man’s-land 
and into the German trenches.
 By 14 August, preparations 
were complete and the rain had 
ceased. All that remained was to 
get the ten assaulting battalions 
into their jumping-off positions 
in front of the Canadian lines. By 
most accounts, the assembly went 
smoothly, although most of the 
battalions encountered German 
shells and gas. Kenneth Cousland, a 
forward observation officer with the 
2nd Divisional Artillery, remembered 
that, on his way to the front, “We had 
a good deal of gas, the new mustard 
gas, and had to spend the night in 
our respirators.”18 Because of the 
difficulties of moving about with 
respirators on, especially in the dark, 
many units did not arrive at their 
positions until 0400 hours, only 25 
minutes before zero hour.19 However, 
everyone was ready when the attack 
began.
 At 0425 hours on 15 August the 
barrage began and the Canadians 
went over the top. Deward Barnes, 
who was watching from the support 
trenches with the rest of his 19th 
Battalion, described Hill 70 as “the 
greatest artillery fight I had ever 
seen.”20 Arthur Lapointe, in the 
first wave with the 22nd Battalion, 
described the opening moments of 
the battle: 
Zero hour! A roll as of heavy thunder 
sounds and the sky is split by great 
sheets of flame. Our guns have given 
the signal.”Forward!” our captain 
shouts, but his voice is lost in the 
cannonade. Shells pass in salvos 
over our heads and through the deep 
roaring of the guns I can hear the 
staccato rat-a-tat of machine guns.21
 The 1st Brigade of the Canadian 
Field Artillery, comprising just 24 of 
the 275 guns active in the barrage, 
fired a total of 9,856 shells in the first 
24 hours of the assault.22 
 The Canadians had to advance 
through a  ser ies  of  trenches, 
beginning, in some cases, with the 
lightly-held German front line. The 
attackers’ objectives were colour-
coded to allow easy identification. 
The intermediate Blue Line ran across 
the summit of Hill 70, through two 
woods on the northern slope, and 
the edge of Cité St. Emile on the 
southern side of the hill. The cités 
were suburbs of Lens where miners 
had lived before the war. Now they 
were merely piles of rubble from 
destroyed buildings that offered 
excellent protection for the defending 
Germans. The Canadians had to cross 
through several of these suburbs on 
their way to their objectives. At the 
Blue Line, most lead battalions were 
to stop, consolidate their positions, 
and allow a fresh battalion to pass 
through their ranks to continue the 
assault on the final objective: the 
Green Line. This was a system of old 
German trenches that ran along the 
eastern slope of the hill and wrapped 
back to the eastern edge of Cité St. 
Elizabeth. The 2nd Brigade, which 
had the furthest distance to cover, 
had a second intermediate objective, 
Left: Canadian troops unload shells in 
preparation for the upcoming offensive.
Below left: Canadian artillerymen 
prepare a gun emplacement. Note the 
tramline to facilitate the supply of 
ammunition.
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the Red Line, to reach before taking 
the Green Line.23 
 Nicholson makes the advance on 
the German front line seem routine 
but the war diaries paint a different 
picture.24 At the northern end of the 
attack, the 15th Battalion met a group 
of determined German defenders at 
the enemy’s front line. The trench 
was quite wide, and the Germans 
stood shoulder-to-shoulder. Without 
hesitation, the men of the 15th leapt 
into the trench and engaged the 
Germans in hand-to-hand combat, 
with many of the enemy falling at 
the point of a Canadian bayonet.25 
Further to the south, the 5th Battalion 
encountered the fortified “Dynamite 
House.” Although it was in the 22nd 
Battalion’s sector, a strong German 
garrison held up the advance of 
the 5th. A group of men charged 
the Germans and a violent struggle 
took place before the Canadians 
overwhelmed the defenders.26
 As Canadian troops approached 
the Blue Line, German resistance 
stiffened. The Van Doos (22nd 
Battalion), moving through the debris 
of Cité St. Laurent, found themselves 
checked by a machine gun that was 
causing severe casualties in “B” 
Company, on the left. Two soldiers, 
Lieutenant Henri de Varennes and 
Sergeant Eugene Keller, quickly took 
the initiative and charged the gun. 
After killing its crew, they turned 
the weapon around and fired on the 
fleeing Germans.27 The 10th Battalion 
faced a similar situation. Corporal 
Nicholas Purmal noticed a group 
of Germans attempting to bring a 
machine gun into action at the lip of 
a shell hole. He charged the position, 
but was shot through the arm before 
reaching the group. Slowed, but 
not stopped, he continued forward, 
tipped the gun back into the hole 
and forced the surrender of the 
officer and his surviving men.28 
Heroic actions such as these won 
the day for the Canadians. Although 
the artillery played an important 
role in protecting the infantry, it 
was up to individual soldiers to 
ensure the safety of their friends and 
platoon-mates. During the chaos of 
the opening moments of the attack, 
it would have been impossible to 
call in artillery support for every 
troublesome machine gun or fortified 
shell hole that the infantry came 
across. Only brave charges by selfless 
soldiers allowed the Canadians to 
continue their advance.
 As the Canadians occupied the 
Blue Line, in many cases less than 
half-an-hour from the beginning of 
the attack, they began to consolidate 
their new positions as they waited for 
reinforcements. The barrage, which 
had given the infantry ample cover 
during their initial advance, paused 
as well. The 13th Battalion suffered 
Above right: A heavy howitzer position is 
prepared in Lens. This photo was taken 
in February 1918, but this type of heavy 
gun was used for counter-battery tasks 
at Hill 70.
Right: Canadian artillerymen load their 
gun during the Hill 70 battle.
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an unfortunate event as Lieutenant 
Colonel McCuaig was trying to set-
up his headquarters in a dugout filled 
with German prisoners. A member 
of a mopping-up party from another 
battalion arrived and, seeing the 
dugout filled with Germans, opened 
fire. A 13th Battalion runner was 
killed and two signalers wounded, 
while McCuaig himself barely 
escaped injury.29 While this was going 
on, the men of McCuaig’s battalion 
were suffering heavily as they waited 
in their new positions for the advance 
to continue. The Germans directed 
heavy artillery fire onto the 13th 
Battalion’s trenches and, to make 
matters worse, a Canadian battery 
was repeatedly firing short, right 
into the midst of the Canadians. 
Just as the men were becoming 
extremely discouraged, a piper from 
the neighbouring 16th Battalion 
appeared in front of them, playing 
his instrument loudly as shells fell 
around him. As he marched off in 
the direction of his own battalion, the 
men’s mood improved significantly.30 
At 0535 hours, the barrage lifted 
again and the men of the 13th 
Battalion, along with the rest of the 
attackers, advanced on the Green 
Line. On the right, “D” Company 
had lost most of its officers, so Major 
Mathewson, from “B” Company, 
took charge. He ordered his men to 
crawl slowly from shell hole-to-shell 
hole, since the company was well 
under-strength. However, the wait 
at the Blue Line had the men itching 
for a fight, and as soon as some of 
the German defenders began to run 
from their position in the Green Line, 
Mathewson gave the order and his 
company charged forward, storming 
the trench with their bayonets and 
capturing a dozen prisoners after a 
brief fight.31 
 To the south, the 8th Battalion 
had leap-frogged the 5th and was 
now closing in on the Red Line. Two 
machine guns in a fortified shell hole 
gave them trouble, so Corporal P.A. 
Litster rushed forward, shooting one 
gunner from the hip as he ran. He 
then bayoneted the four remaining 
Germans and turned one of the 
guns on the defenders.32 To the 8th’s 
left, the 7th Battalion was having 
problems of its own. As they began 
their attack on the Red Line, they 
encountered heavy resistance from 
German machine guns, which were 
eventually subdued with grenades 
and concentrated Lewis gun fire. By 
the time the battalion reached the Red 
Line, only two officers from the lead 
companies were uninjured.33 After 
the Red Line was firmly in Canadian 
hands, these two battalions began to 
consolidate and ready themselves 
for the final push on the Green Line.
 Meanwhile,  the rest of the 
battalions, with shorter distances to 
travel, were already approaching the 
final objective. The 24th Battalion, 
which had passed the 25th, had a 
rough time during this final push. 
One of its two lead companies was 
held up by strong enemy resistance, 
so “A” Company advanced on 
its own. By the time it reached 
Chicory and Norman trenches, 
which represented the Green Line 
in that sector, only one officer and 
20 other ranks were left standing. 
Before reinforcements could be sent 
up, the depleted company had to deal 
with two bombing attacks: German 
counterattackers lobbing grenades 
at the tired Canadian infanteers from 
intersecting communication trenches. 
Despite their weakened state, the 
men of “A” Company held the 
position until fresh troops arrived.34 
While the troops were mopping up 
the remaining German positions, 
Lieutenant D.M. Matheson became 
involved in what the regimental 
history called a “revolver duel” with 
a German officer. The German fired 
and missed, and was subsequently 
shot dead by Matheson.35
 In his memoir, Arthur Lapointe 
of the Van Doos described the scene 
after a mopping up party encountered 
a group of Germans: 
A section in the second wave has 
come up a communication trench 
and opened fire with a machine-gun 
on the Germans, who must have 
come piling up from a dugout when 
our barrage had passed. Now they 
lie in a mass of grey, with blood 
splashed all around. One lifts a hand 
to his chest and falls in a dugout 
entrance. I shall never forget his face, 
a mask of tortured agony.36
 The Germans had an intricate 
system of trenches on Hill 70. Once 
they reached their final objectives, 
the Canadians had to deal with 
counterattacks across no-man’s-
land,  and with Germans who 
attacked along support trenches 
which extended away from the new 
Canadian front line. 
 The 15th Battalion encountered 
fierce resistance at their final 
objective. However, by 0542 hours, 
less than an hour-and-a-half after the 
battle began, the Green Line was in 
their hands. A trench mortar, along 
The intensity of the Canadian artillery 
can be witnessed by this German soldier 
who was half-buried by the barrage.
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with 500 shells, was captured by the 
battalion. The gun’s crew explained 
its operation to the Canadians, and 
the shells, 36 of which contained gas, 
were subsequently fired at enemy 
positions.37 From the comfort of our 
couches, nearly a century later, it 
may seem mutinous for a German 
soldier to explain the workings of 
his weapon to a Canadian whom 
he knows will promptly turn that 
weapon on his comrades. However, 
our response might be somewhat 
different if we consider that these 
Germans had just been subjected to 
days of non-stop shelling and seen 
many of their fellow soldiers killed by 
the same Canadians who were now 
pointing rifle muzzles at their heads 
and bayonets at their stomachs. 
 L i e u t e n a n t - C o l o n e l  B e n t , 
commander of the 15th Battalion, was 
confronted by a group of Germans 
who came out of a dugout behind 
him. He was alone, but held his 
attackers at bay until some of his men 
rushed to his aid.38 Later in the day, 
around 1230 hours, Bent would have 
another close call when a German 
counterattack pressed to within 50 
yards of his headquarters. Bent and 
a small group of runners charged 
the enemy and shocked them into 
retreat.39 
 By 0600 hours the Canadians 
had reached the Green Line all 
along the front, except in the 2nd 
Brigade’s sector, where the 7th and 
8th Battalions had stopped at the Red 
Line.40 Now, the tables turned and 
the Canadians were the defenders 
of Hill 70 as the Germans tried to 
take it back. Shortly after 0600 hours 
the Canadians were already fending 
off German counterattacks across 
their entire front. The Germans 
attempted to throw all their reserves 
at the Canadians before they could 
consolidate their new positions.41 It 
was at this point that the artillery 
played its most important role. While 
McNaughton’s guns worked to 
neutralize the German artillery, the 
rest of the artillery began responding 
to S.O.S. calls from the infantry as 
soon as they saw the Germans mass 
for a counterattack in the woods 
or cités east of the hill. Repeatedly, 
the Canadian batteries destroyed 
German units before they had a 
chance to move from their assembly 
points. In his memoir, Sergeant 
Routley of the 18th Battalion, which 
was holding a section of trench in 
the middle of Cité St. Elizabeth, very 
close to Lens, described the artillery’s 
response to his S.O.S. call: 
I dropped on my knees and sent up 
the S.O.S. and then dropped back 
again for a few minutes to have a 
little rest, before taking over my job 
as lookout for the platoon. I never 
seen such good [sic] Artillery action 
in my life. As a matter of fact, I didn’t 
think that the Artillery had worked 
on my S.O.S. at all. I thought that 
somebody else had seen the Germans 
This oblique aerial photograph was taken from a balloon tethered behind Canadian lines prior to the battle. It shows the 
area captured the 24th and 26th Battalions on 15-16 August, and the area attacked by the 29th Battalion on 21 August.
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coming and had telephoned our 
artillery, for before the varey-lights 
[sic] had finished burning the heavy 
machine guns began firing over our 
heads and everything on the line of 
Artillery opened up. It was some 
days later, when I was talking to 
the Adjutant of our Battalion, Major 
Bell, that I learned that it was my 
S.O.S. that they had worked on. He 
said that he was in the Observation 
Post with an officer of the Artillery 
when they seen [sic] my S.O.S. and 
they immediately telephoned the 
Artillery, who had their guns all 
layed and ready.42 
Without this sort of quick work by the 
artillery, the Canadians might have 
been overwhelmed during their first 
hours on top of Hill 70, while they 
struggled to construct strongpoints 
and reverse the German defences 
under heavy fire.
 The work of the artillery was 
made easier by the continuous 
wave wireless sets. Much faster 
and more reliable than any other 
communication system, the wireless 
sets allowed forward observers 
to instantly call in targets to the 
artil lery. In fact,  one forward 
observer was completely reliant on 
wireless communications once the 
attack began. The German shellfire 
was so intense that 15 linemen 
could not maintain communication 
between the observer and the 
artillery headquarters. However, 
his continuous wave set allowed 
him to continue relaying targets 
and answering S.O.S. calls from the 
desperate infantry. W. Arthur Steel 
called the Battle of Hill 70 the birth 
of the continuous wave system.43 
 James Edmonds recorded in the 
British Official History that, during 
the counterattacks on 15 August, 
“not a single German soldier reached 
the Canadian line alive.”44 This was 
simply not the case. The artillery 
could not stop all the German 
counterattacks. Many times, the 
artillery was either not on target, or 
the barrage was not dense enough to 
stop the German forces from closing 
in on the Canadian lines. In these 
cases, the machine gun positions that 
had been established in the front lines 
were very effective.45 Still, several 
times German attackers reached the 
parapets of the Canadian trenches 
and had to be driven back with 
bombs and bayonets.
 The Royal Flying Corps (RFC), 
with many Canadian pilots, was 
also instrumental in the infantry’s 
success at Hill 70. Six days before the 
attack, all six German observation 
balloons in the Hill 70-Lens sector 
were shot down by 40 Squadron. 
Then, for the two days preceding 
the assault, bombers from three 
squadrons attacked enemy targets 
behind the front lines. During the 
battle itself, two innovations in the air 
war were introduced. To combat low-
flying German observation planes, 
the RFC employed a forward airfield 
at Mazingarbe, five miles from the 
battlefield. This allowed British and 
Canadian pilots to take-off as soon 
as an enemy plane was spotted 
near Hill 70 and quickly engage the 
target. Thanks to this new tactic, two 
German planes were destroyed and 
three shot down out of control on 15 
August. The other innovation also 
involved the use of the advanced 
landing ground at Mazingarbe to 
allow RFC aircraft more time over 
the battlefield. No.43 Squadron 
operated from this base, observing 
areas behind the German lines in an 
attempt to locate counterattacks while 
they were forming up. Several times, 
airmen engaged German troops 
in low-level machine gun attacks, 
and these planes also relayed target 
information back to the Canadian 
artillery.46 
 By mid-morning on the 15th, 
most of the battalions had already 
repulsed several counterattacks. 
However, the 7th and 8th Battalions 
were still on the offensive, trying to 
capture the Chalk Pit, an abandoned 
quarry that offered excellent cover 
and was heavily fortified with at least 
20 machine guns. It would prove a 
difficult task.47 As the 7th Battalion 
moved forward, Germans at the 
junction of Hugo Trench and Hurrah 
Alley, in front of the Chalk Pit and 
the Green Line, swept the Canadians 
with machine gun fire. After a fierce 
battle, rifle grenadiers and small 
arms fire silenced the Germans. This 
Pillars of smoke mark the start of 
a German counterattack against 
Canadian positions on Hill 70.
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allowed the battalion to advance as 
far as the edge of the Chalk Pit, where 
German fire once again stopped 
them.48 It was soon determined that 
the 7th and 8th Battalions did not 
have the strength to take the Chalk 
Pit as they were down to about 200 
men. Therefore, they were ordered 
to consolidate their positions on the 
Red Line, where the 5th and 10th 
Battalions would relieve them later 
that night.49
 Countera t tacks  cont inued 
throughout the night of 15/16 August, 
and German shelling hampered 
promised reliefs. Arthur Lapointe, 
recorded his experiences that night 
in his diary:
We must wait for the rations which 
are coming up, then we can drop off 
to sleep. There is an air of relaxation 
in the dugout. Even the company 
commander smiles at the rough jests 
of the men. Suddenly, an N.C.O. 
staggers in, his face haggard and his 
eyes staring. He is dusty and sweat 
is pouring down his face: “Sir” he 
cries, “of twenty-five men on the 
ration party only three are left. Lieut. 
Devarenne is dead and—.” Horror 
stricken, we listen to the ghastly 
news.50
In the pitch black, with German shells 
and gas covering the battlefield, it 
was difficult to get men or supplies 
forward, and the exhausted troops 
were left at the front to face another 
day of counterattacks.
 Overnight, the 5th and 10th 
Battalions were successful in relieving 
their weary brigade-mates. On the 
morning of 16 August, Brigadier 
General F.O.W. Loomis advanced 
beyond the Red Line to ensure that 
everything was in place for the 
renewal of his brigade’s attack on 
the Chalk Pit that evening at 1600 
hours. While he was in the front lines, 
he took the opportunity to talk with 
some of his men, whom he found 
to be in good spirits and anxious 
to get the attack underway, despite 
the hard fighting they had already 
experienced.51
 Throughout the day on the 16th, 
numerous German counterattacks 
were mounted and summarily 
repulsed. The Canadian assault on 
the Chalk Pit began as scheduled. 
The 10th Battalion advanced quickly 
on the left, entering the quarry, 
killing 100 Germans and taking 
130 prisoners.52 On the right, the 
5th Battalion was held up almost 
immediately, leaving the 10th’s flank 
exposed. The men from the 10th 
Battalion were not slowed by this 
as they charged into the Chalk Pit 
scattering the Germans in retreat.53 
As the defenders fled, Canadian 
machine gunners cut them down. 
One Lewis gun team, consisting of 
Privates Ewart Bateman and Harry 
Baxter, lost the tripod for their gun. 
Not wanting to miss the easy targets 
presented to them, Baxter threw 
himself on the ground and allowed 
Bateman to balance the gun on his 
back as he fired at the Germans.54 
 After a bitter fight, the 5th 
Battalion eventually caught up to 
the 10th at the Green Line. However, 
attempts to send runners to establish 
contact between the two units failed 
as German snipers repeatedly 
picked them off. By 1730 hours, 
the 5th Battalion was almost out 
of ammunition after pushing back 
numerous counterattacks. Private 
F.J. Tingley crawled back along the 
trenches collecting grenades and 
bombs and distributing them to 
the men. He then posted himself 
on the parapet and began to snipe 
at the Germans advancing across 
no-man’s-land. Soon, only 15 men 
could be mustered by the battalion 
to carry on the fight. Consequently, 
they withdrew their position 50 
yards from the Green Line. At 1830 
hours, a party of 50 men from one of 
the support companies arrived and 
the battalion retook the Green Line. 
Before long their lone machine gun 
was put out of action and again they 
were forced to retire some 50 yards.55 
 With the retreat of the 5th 
Battalion, the 10th’s flank was 
exposed once more. Lance-Sergeant 
John Wennevold held a small post 
at the battalion’s extreme right. An 
American from Minnesota, he had 
been severely wounded at Second 
Ypres and subsequently served 
as an instructor in England, but 
requested to be sent back to the 
10th. His small party was attacked 
three times and each time he was 
the only survivor. Finally, with his 
fourth set of reinforcements, he held 
The Chalk Pit, photographed in 1919.
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the position until the battalion was 
relieved that night.56 The 5th was 
relieved at the same time, and both 
battalions retired for a well-deserved 
rest. By 18 August, it became clear 
that the Canadian position in the 
Chalk Pit was not tenable, so the 
decision was made to pull the line 
back about 300 yards from the Green 
Line in that sector.57
 The effectiveness of the artillery 
during the attack into the Chalk 
Pit is attested to in a journalistic-
style history that was published 
immediately after the war, called 
The Great Adventure with the 4th 
Battery, Canadian Field Artillery. As 
the two battalions were engaged in 
a desperate struggle, 
the infantry made known their 
distress by flare after flare. These had 
scarcely reached their zenith when 
Eighteen-Pounder ‘iron rations’ were 
being distributed freely amongst the 
Huns. So rapid was the fire that a 
wounded infantry officer, en route 
for the dressing-station, peered 
into the gun-pit and flatteringly 
demanded, “What new type of 
machine gun is that, boys?”58
 However, the going was not 
always so smooth for the artillery at 
Hill 70. On the night of 17/18 August, 
15,000-20,000 mustard gas shells were 
fired at the Canadian batteries. The 
German counterattacks continued, 
and the strain of lifting and carrying 
shells began to fog up the eye-pieces 
on the gunners’ respirators. To keep 
up their rate of fire and protect the 
weakened infantry, many gunners 
chose to remove their gas masks 
rather than slow down. By the next 
morning, 183 men from the 1st and 
2nd Artillery Brigades had been 
severely gassed. After the battle, 
K.B. Jackson, a gunner with the 1st 
Divisional Artillery, wrote that “we 
had only five Sergeants and cooks, 
and lord knows what, manning the 
guns.” The gunners were heroes, 
though, and recognized as such by 
the infantry.59 Had the gunners not 
continued their support of the troops 
holding the line, it is highly likely that 
the Germans would have been able to 
retake Hill 70. 
 The infantry was exhausted and 
the protective screen set-up by the 
artillery helped to keep them alive. 
Many soldiers had been in the line 
since the opening day of the attack 
without relief. On 22 August, Arthur 
Lapointe described the situation in 
his battalion:
We were to have been relieved on 
the night after the attack and here 
we are, a week later, still holding this 
miserable sector in which so many 
of our comrades have died. Each 
day the enemy has tried to regain 
some of the ground torn from his 
grasp. Prisoners say that German 
Great Headquarters has ordered the 
ground retaken at all costs and that 
divisions of the Prussian Guard have 
been sent forward for the purpose.60
 The counterattacks, including 
these elite units from the Prussian 
Guard, continued throughout the day 
on 18 August. On the 18th Battalion’s 
front, close to Lens, a large group of 
Germans broke through the line and 
a savage fight to the death ensued. 
Eventually, the Canadians drove the 
attackers out of the trench, although 
they left behind some 500 casualties. 
General Erich Ludendorff, deputy 
chief of staff of the German Army, 
visited Lens on that day, and after 
determining that this was not a major 
British offensive, called off the large-
scale counterattacks.61 The battle for 
Hill 70 was won, but the fight for Lens 
was just beginning.
* * * * *
Although the 4th Division had made a feint towards the city 
on the 15th, the ultimate goal of the 
battle was still to drive the Germans 
out of the city. To do this, the 6th, 
10th, and 11th Brigades planned a 
series of attacks into Lens from 21-
25 August. On the morning of the 21 
August, the 27th and 29th Battalions 
attempted to push out beyond the 
Green Line in the 2nd Division’s 
sector. Just as the attackers prepared 
to climb out of their trenches, a 
German force began to advance 
across no-man’s-land towards the 
29th Battalion. The Canadian barrage 
caught many of the Germans, but 
some got through. The Canadians 
soon ran short of grenades and 
hand-to-hand combat ensued. After 
briefly gaining a foothold in Nun’s 
Alley, a trench that connected to the 
Green Line but was still occupied 
by Germans, the 29th was forced to 
withdraw to its starting position.62
 On the right, the 27th Battalion 
did not fare much better. Shortly after 
the attack began, the Canadians were 
halted in no-man’s-land by heavy 
machine gun fire. Since they were 
attacking through the ruins of the 
city, the Germans had excellent cover 
and could hide out in the basements 
of destroyed buildings. Still, the men 
of the 27th pressed on and were able 
to gain some of their objectives.63 
 As this was occurring, the 10th 
Brigade mounted an attack against 
the western part of Lens. Three 
battalions, the 46th, 47th, and 50th 
were employed, and despite fierce 
resistance from the Germans, they 
reached some of their objectives. 
Private Percy Hellings, a scout in 
the 46th Battalion, remembered 
the intense fire his battalion faced: 
“By the time we got halfway up 
that embankment the old machine 
guns really opened up on us. We 
thought there must have been a 
million of them – boy, the noise and 
the racket!”64 The Canadians fought 
through some of the defences, but the 
Germans still held some positions in 
their line, compromising the integrity 
of the newly-won Canadian ground. 
Therefore, it was soon decided to 
pull most of the units back to their 
original positions. The 6th Brigade 
did likewise, leaving the Canadians 
with a high body count and not much 
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to show for it. On that day alone, the 
Canadians suffered 1,154 casualties 
including 346 killed.65
 Despite these casualties, there 
was still a desire to capture Lens as 
soon as possible. This set the stage for 
what proved to be the final attack in 
the Battle of Hill 70. 
 The Green Crassier was a huge 
pile of coal waste that overlooked 
the eastern part of Lens, as well as 
the Canadian lines to the west. It 
was an important strategic position, 
and its capture would have given the 
corps possession of the high ground 
around half of Lens. However, the 
attempt to take the Crassier by the 
44th Battalion turned into a debacle, 
wasting dozens of Canadian lives. 
There are numerous reasons for this 
failure, one of which was the push 
from Major-General David Watson, 
commander of the 4th Division, to 
take the Crassier. As we shall see, 
the blame cannot fall solely on his 
shoulders, as Haig and Horne wanted 
the Canadians to take Lens all along 
and Currie certainly did not want to 
disappoint them. Undoubtedly their 
influence, although not direct, played 
a part in Canadian generals ordering 
the capture of the Crassier.
 At 2230 hours on 15 August, as 
the first day of fighting was winding 
down at Hill 70, HQ Canadian Corps 
issued an order outlining future 
objectives and instructing that plans 
be made for their capture. One of the 
objectives listed for the 4th Division 
was the Green Crassier.66 Even from 
this early stage in the battle, it is clear 
that Currie anticipated the imminent 
capture of Lens.
 Five days later, 4th Division HQ 
issued an order stating that if the 
attacks by the 46th, 47th, and 50th 
Battalions were successful on the 
21st, the 44th Battalion would take 
the Green Crassier. According to 
this order, it would be up to the 10th 
Brigade’s commander, Brigadier-
General Hilliam, to decide if and 
when the attack would take place.67 
The attacks on 21 August were a 
failure, and at this point, the officer 
in command of the 44th Battalion 
protested the plan. Lieutenant-
Colonel W.D. Davies argued that 
even if his troops gained the height of 
the Crassier, they would be cut off by 
the strong German garrison at Fosse 
St. Louis, a small rise with a cluster 
of buildings to the northwest of the 
waste pile. Hilliam overruled him.68
 On 22 August, at 1500 hours 
Major-General Watson asked Corps 
HQ for permission to go ahead with 
the attack on the Crassier that night, 
saying that it was a menace to the 
Canadian line as long as it remained 
in German hands. Currie agreed, 
provided Watson was convinced that 
the plan was sound, the troops were 
familiar with the ground, and they 
had practiced the attack as much 
as possible.69 This was obviously 
an unrealistic expectation, as the 
battalion could not be pulled out 
of the line in the middle of a battle 
to go over a taped practice course. 
Nonetheless, at 1720 hours, Watson 
issued an order to the 44th Battalion 
to carry out their operation against 
the Crassier beginning at 0300 hours 
that night.70
 Fosse St. Louis, with a small 
cluster of ruined buildings covering 
access to the Crassier, was supposed 
to have been cleared of enemy troops 
during a previous raid, but, only 
minutes before zero hour, the 44th 
Battalion realized that it was held by 
a strong German force. Therefore, 
the task of the two assault companies 
was split, with one carrying out the 
original plan to attack the Crassier, 
and the other directed to clear Fosse 
St. Louis. The first company mounted 
the Crassier rather easily in the 
darkness, but the other company 
faced stiff opposition including five 
machine guns.71
 At the break of dawn, the 
Canadians exposed on top of the 
Crassier began to be swept by 
German machine gun fire. Since 
Fosse St. Louis was still in enemy 
hands, there was no way to get any 
additional men or supplies to the 
top of the waste pile, and soon small 
pockets of men became isolated in 
shell holes.72 One soldier, who was 
captured on the Crassier, wrote:
The slack heap was sure an easy 
place to dig in – nothing but old coal 
slack and loose dirt, which was sure a 
give-away to us when daylight came; 
the fresh dirt thrown out showed 
up so black. Then we were up so 
high you dare not look out or they 
would shoot you in the head from 
any direction. The slack heap on the 
side next [to] the Germans dropped 
almost straight down. But they had 
a trench they could come up, so close 
to us they could throw their potato 
mashers at us. First whenever they 
The “Green Crassier,” photographed in 1919.
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came at us we put them away with 
our Mills bombs; but they were soon 
all gone.73
 As the Canadians’ ammunition 
began to run out, the Germans slowly 
began pushing their way back across 
the Crassier. By late afternoon, the 
Germans had killed or captured 
every Canadian on the Crassier. Fosse 
St. Louis also remained in enemy 
hands .74
 Although the 50th Battalion 
carried out a minor attack on 25 
August to consolidate their position, 
the battle was effectively over after 
the failure on the Crassier. The 44th 
Battalion had suffered 257 casualties 
in the attack, and over the next four 
days an attempt was made to discern 
what had gone wrong.75 
 On 26 August, Lieutenant-Colonel 
Davies issued a note explaining why 
the plan to attack the Crassier was 
adopted, as well as the reasons for its 
failure. His contention was that there 
were not enough men or supplies to 
support the troops on the Crassier. 
He also noted that his officers had 
expected Fosse St. Louis to be clear 
of Germans.76 The reason for this was 
supplied by Major Art Mills, acting 
commander of the 47th Battalion. 
His battalion was holding Fosse 4, 
near Fosse St. Louis, during the 44th 
Battalion’s attack. Someone, Mills 
does not say who, was apparently 
confused and thought that Fosses 4 
and St. Louis were the same.77 Had 
Fosse St. Louis actually been clear, 
it would have been much easier to 
resupply and reinforce the Canadians 
on top of the Crassier.
 Neither Watson’s nor Currie’s 
personal diaries shed any more 
light on the decision-making which 
led to the failed assault. In light of 
the evidence, it may be surmised 
that Watson did not heed Currie’s 
advice to ensure that the plan was 
sound before proceeding with an 
The vanquished and the victors – Left: German prisoners captured at Hill 70 are marched into 
captivity; Right: Canadians soldiers who fought at Hill 70 head for a well-earned rest.
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General Arthur Currie, holding walking stick, at a memorial service to men who fell during the Hill 70 advance, September 1917.
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attack on the Crassier. At the same 
time, though, he may have been a 
victim of faulty intelligence, since it 
seems that everyone believed Fosse 
St. Louis to be clear until minutes 
before the attack. Indeed, a Canadian 
intelligence report from 23 August 
stated that, “during the course of 
last night our troops occupied Puits 4 
Fosse St. Louis.”78 Brigadier-General 
Hilliam must also share in the blame 
for the debacle on the Crassier. He 
should have taken the advice of 
Lieutenant-Colonel Davies, who 
had personally seen the front before 
the attack and strongly protested 
sending his men forward. It should 
also be stated that an attack on such 
a small front, comprising only one 
battalion, was reckless. It was really 
nothing more than a trench raid and 
the Germans were well dug in around 
the Crassier. With only a narrow 
avenue of attack, the Germans would 
be able to concentrate a large quantity 
of firepower on a small section of the 
front. Since the Canadians already 
controlled the high ground of Hill 
70, there should have been no rush 
to take Lens. Instead of attacking 
with one or two battalions here and 
there, they could have massed their 
artillery on the hill and proceeded 
to bombard the Germans until they 
were forced to pull back out of the 
city. In fact, on 22 August, this had 
already been considered. A First 
Army intelligence report stated that 
if the Germans were “unable to gain 
more room by counterattacks, their 
losses will probably force them to 
evacuate Lens.”79 Unfortunately, this 
avenue was never explored.
 Despite these setbacks, the battle 
for Hill 70 was a success. As Arthur 
Lapointe watched members of his 
battalion return from the front lines, 
he wrote that, “Coming from the 
furnace after eight days of hardship 
and sorrow, the men’s faces are 
haggard and their clothing torn and 
dusty, but their eyes shine with the 
light of pride in victory.”80 William 
Breckenridge, of the 42nd Battalion, 
remembered a wounded soldier 
on his way to the rear telling him 
“‘Vimy was a cinch compared with 
the Somme; and the Somme was 
easy compared with Hill 70.’”81 Hill 
70 had been a difficult battle, costing 
the Corps 8,677 casualties.82 But the 
objectives of the battle had been won. 
Hill 70 was captured and held, and 
German forces were diverted from 
reinforcing Flanders. The Germans 
had suffered an estimated 20,000 
casualties from five divisions, more 
than double the Canadians’ losses.83 
It was truly a rarity on the Western 
Front to have an attacking force suffer 
fewer casualties than the defenders. 
Thanks to Currie’s strategy, though, 
after the first day of the battle, 
the Canadians had become the 
defenders, forcing the Germans 
to counterattack through a hail of 
shrapnel and machine gun fire. 
 The Battle of Hill 70 does not 
deserve to be relegated to the back 
pages of history. On the CBC’s 
Flanders’ Fields radio program, a series 
of interviews with veterans broadcast 
in 1964, at the end of the episode on 
Vimy the narrator says that “Next 
week, the victorious Canadians 
move down from the heights of Vimy 
Ridge into that incredible bog of 
mud and blood at Passchendaele.”84 
Hill 70 is completely ignored, yet 
Lance-Corporal Kenneth Foster, who 
fought at Hill 70 as a member of the 
3rd Brigade Machine Gun Company, 
wrote in his memoirs that, “in order 
of merit I will put Passchendaele at 
the top of the class, with the Somme 
second, Hill 70 third, Cambrai fourth 
and Amiens fifth, they being the five 
most important engagements that the 
Canadians took part in.”85 He leaves 
out Vimy Ridge, but the message is 
clear: the men who fought at Hill 70 
recognized the importance of the 
battle, even if historians have not.
 Hill 70 built on the reputation the 
Canadians had earned at 2nd Ypres, 
the Somme, and Vimy Ridge, and 
was a significant stepping-stone on 
their path to becoming elite troops 
on the Western Front. The so-called 
“learning curve” can be discerned 
at Hill 70 by the introduction of 
several new technologies, such as 
the continuous wave wireless sets, 
and the forward landing fields 
allowing pilots more time over the 
battlefield. The use of artillery to 
create a kill-zone as the infantry 
dug-in after a successful attack was 
also an innovation. As well, the 
successes at Vimy and Hill 70 ensured 
that Currie’s methods of diligent 
preparation and cooperation between 
the combat arms would continue 
throughout the war. In a letter of 
thanks to the Royal Artillery, Currie 
wrote that “success must ever be ours 
when the co-operation between all 
services is so marked.”86 Although 
mistakes had been made, most 
notably by not taking advantage of 
the high ground to clear the city, the 
battle had been won. Hill 70 would 
become a part of the Canadian Corps’ 
unbroken string of victories from 
Vimy to Mons, and it contributed to 
the reputation of Currie as one of the 
best generals on the Western Front.
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